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I.

INTRODUCTION

A
I

utonomous weapons are subject to great controversy. They have been
defined as weapon systems1 “that can learn or adapt [their] functioning in
response to changing circumstances in the environment in which [they are]
deployed.”2 Such systems, once developed, should, through sensors that
give them situational awareness, be able to identify both legitimate targets
and hopefully civilians/civilian objects that may potentially suffer incidental
* Professor of International Law at the University of Geneva, Switzerland, Director
of the Department of Public International Law and International Organization, Associate
Professor at the Universite du Quebec, Montreal, Canada and Commissioner within the
International Commission of Jurists. The author would like to thank Ms. Yvette Issar,
doctoral candidate at the University of Geneva, for her valuable research assistance, critical remarks and for having revised this text.
1. Hin-Yan Liu, Categorization and Legality of Autonomous and Remote Weapons Systems, 94
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 627, 635–36 (2012).
2. International Committee of the Red Cross, International Humanitarian Law and the
Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflict: Report Prepared for the 31st International Conference of the
Red Cross and Red Crescent 39 (2011), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/docu
ments/report/31-international-conference-ihl-challenges-report-2011-10-31.htm.
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effects of attack. Identification would then trigger corresponding action
through processors or artificial intelligence that would “decide . . . how to
respond . . . and effectors that carry out those ‘decisions.’”3 Ideally, autonomous weapons would select and engage targets without ongoing human
intervention in an open environment under circumstances which are unstructured and dynamic. At present, no weapon system possesses such capabilities. The absence or presence of human intervention is, however, a
relative distinction, as is the distinction between humans “in,” “on” or “out
of the loop,” which is therefore not very helpful.4 Despite the system’s autonomy, human beings will inevitably be involved, either in overseeing the
operation of the weapon, or at least in producing and programming the
weapon systems. There is agreement that, although these systems do not
yet exist, they could be developed within twenty years. Many request that
they be purely, simply and preventively banned, specifically because their
use would not be consistent with international humanitarian law (IHL).5
The 117 States parties to the UN Conventional Weapons Convention6 have
agreed to hold this year a four-day intergovernmental meeting to explore
questions related to lethal autonomous weapon systems with a view to potentially drafting a Protocol VI to the Convention.7 Even the United States,
which is among the most technologically advanced States in this field, currently requires that such weapon systems “be designed to allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of judgment over the use of

3. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Report, ¶
39, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/23/47 (Apr. 9, 2013) (by Christof Heyns) [hereinafter Heyns].
4. PETER W. SINGER, WIRED FOR WAR: THE ROBOTICS REVOLUTION AND CONFLICT IN THE 21ST CENTURY 124–27 (2009).
5. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LOSING HUMANITY: THE CASE AGAINST KILLER ROBOTS (2012), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2012/11/19/losing-humanity; European Parliament Resolution on the Use of Armed Drones ¶ H.2(d) (2014/2567(RSP))
(Feb. 25, 2014); Peter Asaro, On Banning Autonomous Weapon Systems: Human Rights, Automation, and the Dehumanization of Lethal Decision-Making, 94 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE
RED CROSS 687 (2012).
6. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional
Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate
Effects, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137.
7. Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be
Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Geneva, Switz., Nov. 14–15,
2013, Final Report, ¶¶ 18, 32, U.N. Doc. CCW.MSP/2013/10 (Dec. 16, 2013), available at
http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/4361535.01272202.html.
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force,”8 which means that it is not admissible for producers to program
machines that make final decisions as to targets against which force shall be
used.
It is perhaps because I have been confronted in actual armed conflicts
with so many violations committed by human beings, but inevitably never
with atrocities by robots9 (although admittedly, they did not exist in the
armed conflicts I witnessed), that my first feeling is not skepticism, but
hope for better respect of IHL.10 Only human beings can be inhuman and
only human beings can deliberately choose not to comply with the rules
they were instructed to follow. To me, it seems more reasonable to expect
(and to ensure) a person who devises and constructs an autonomous
weapon in a peaceful workplace to comply with IHL than a soldier on the
battlefield or in a hostile environment. A robot cannot hate, cannot fear,
cannot be hungry or tired and has no survival instinct.11 “Robots do not
rape.”12 They can sense more information simultaneously and process it
faster than a human being.13 As the weapons actually delivering kinetic
force become increasingly quicker and more complex, it may be that humans become simply too overwhelmed by information and the decisions
that must be taken to direct them.14 Human beings often kill others to
avoid being killed themselves. The robot can delay the use of force until
the last, most appropriate moment, when it has been established that the
target and the attack are legitimate. Certainly, there may be technical failures, but all those who drive cars and every traffic policeman know that
8. U.S. Department of Defense, DoD Directive 3000.09, Autonomy in Weapon Systems ¶ 3(a) (2012).
9. The terms “atrocity” or “violation,” like many other terms which describe human
behavior used in this article, are admittedly not appropriate for a machine.”
10. For a detailed, powerful, but not always entirely convincing plea, see RONALD C.
ARKIN, GOVERNING LETHAL BEHAVIOR IN AUTONOMOUS ROBOTS (2009). For a positive
assessment and call for regulation, see Kenneth Anderson & Matthew Waxman, Law and
Ethics for Autonomous Weapons Systems: Why a Ban Won’t Work and How the Laws of War Can,
HOOVER INSTITUTE (Apr. 9, 2013), http://www.hoover.org/publications/monographs
/144241.
11. Ronald C. Arkin, Ethical Robots in Warfare, GEORGIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
(Jan. 20, 2009), http://www.cc.gatech.edu/ai/robot-lab/online-publications/arkin-rev.pdf;
Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Interim Report, ¶ 20
(by Philip Alston), transmitted by Note of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/65/321 (Aug. 23,
2010) [hereinafter Alston].
12. Heyns, supra note 3, ¶ 54.
13. SINGER, supra note 4, at 127.
14. Arkin, supra note 11; SINGER, supra note 4, at 128.
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most accidents are not due to technical, but human, failures (although drivers, unlike soldiers, are usually not seeking to kill or injure).
As soon as robots have artificial intelligence, one must obviously also
make sure that such intelligence is not used in the same way as some human intelligence is used, i.e., to circumvent the rules or to decide—from a
purely utilitarian perspective—that non-respect of instructions that conform to IHL may make it easier to achieve the main objective of overcoming the enemy. In addition, States developing and producing autonomous
weapon systems must—and will in their own interest—take measures to
prevent the enemy from tampering with such systems and directing them
against the producing State and its civilians.15
It is obviously not up to me as a lawyer to speculate on whether autonomous weapons that (a) do not share the same disadvantages of human
beings fighting wars and (b) are able to function in compliance with the
principles and rules on distinction, proportionality and precautions as well
as human beings can be developed. I will nevertheless first highlight this
technical question which is, in my view, decisive, and one to which I have
no answer. It is a question to which a definitive answer must be supplied
before such weapon systems may be used (Part II). Next I will address
some preliminary issues which either go beyond IHL or are raised by autonomous weapon systems just as they are for other means of warfare (Part
III). The principal portion of the article will then be devoted to the specific
problems autonomous weapon systems may raise under IHL and whether
they may be able to comply—or provide even greater compliance—with
the core IHL targeting principles of distinction, proportionality and precautions in attack (Part IV).
II.

THE CRUCIAL TECHNICAL ISSUE

As explained above, I consider that weapon systems which do not base the
use of force upon an ad hoc human decision offer the advantage of a
greater possibility of respecting IHL. However, this presupposes that it is
technically possible to make them as accurate as an average soldier in terms
of distinction, proportionality and precautions. The main question remains

15. Michael N. Schmitt & Jeffrey S. Thurnher, “Out of the Loop”: Autonomous Weapon
Systems and the Law of Armed Conflict, 4 HARVARD NATIONAL SECURITY JOURNAL 231, 242–
43 (2013).
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a technical one:16 is it, or will it one day be, possible to develop a robot able
to sense information and thereafter to act such that it distinguishes–in the
same manner as a human being—between legitimate targets, i.e., military
objectives, combatants, civilians directly participating in hostilities on the
one hand, and those protected by IHL from attacks, i.e., civilians and civilian objects, specially protected objects such as cultural property, objects
indispensable for the survival of the civilian population, medical units, etc.,
on the other?
Many experts consider that development of robots with that capability
is impossible given the current technology. I have seen no official pronouncement indicating that it is possible, nor am I aware of anyone suggesting that autonomous weapon systems may be used even if such development turns out to be impossible. Governments with the possible ability
to produce these kinds of weapons indicate that genuinely autonomous
deployment is not currently envisaged.17 William Boothby, the most renowned weapons law expert I know, and who has a strong military background, envisages their autonomy, without human supervision, only in very
limited and predetermined environments.18 It is claimed that no one envisages developing any system “without restrictive engagement parameters,
such as limiting the area of operation or nature of the target” (even among
lawful targets).19 It is also true that wars are full of “friction” and unexpected situations.20 All this makes me skeptical of whether it will be possible to create a machine with the necessary contextual intelligence to adapt
to the great variety of situations which may arise in hostilities. Nevertheless, I cannot predict possible future developments.
That autonomous weapon systems will operate in dynamic and unstructured circumstances does not mean that those circumstances are unforeseeable. An important question I am unable to answer concerns
whether it is possible to program these weapons to adapt a rule to circumstances not foreseen by the programmer, or whether they can only deal
16. See also Jakob Kellenberger, President, International Committee of the Red Cross,
Keynote Address at the 34th Round Table on Current Issues on International Humanitarian Law: International Humanitarian Law and New Weapons Technologies (Sept. 9, 2011),
in 94 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 812 (2012).
17. Heyns, supra note 3, ¶ 29. SINGER, supra note 4, at 128, is skeptical. See, e.g., DOD
Directive 3000.09, supra note 8, ¶ 4(a).
18. WILLIAM H. BOOTHBY, WEAPONS AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 282–86
(2009).
19. Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 15, at 241.
20. Asaro, supra note 5, at 691–92.
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with circumstances foreseen by the programmer. If the latter is true, they
would have to be programmed not to act in other circumstances and/or to
notify a human being that he/she must make the necessary decision.21
However, while it may be impossible to program autonomous weapons for
all circumstances which may appear in an armed conflict, might it be possible for them to “learn”?22
It will indeed be a challenge to translate some aspects of IHL—for example, the International Committee of the Red Cross’s (ICRC) Interpretive
Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law23 or various States’ interpretations of the concept of direct
participation in hostilities—into a computer program. This is, however,
necessary. It is not simply an issue of distinguishing between combatants
and civilians in a Cold War-like situation, but in the real contexts of today’s
conflicts. In these conflicts, civilians directly participate in hostilities, rendering application of the principle of distinction difficult for average soldiers, to say nothing of autonomous weapons.
Although I don’t know what is technically feasible, if I take a position
in this article it is primarily because I consider that many objections of
principle against autonomous weapon systems are either questionable from
an IHL point of view, or misunderstand IHL and warfare.
III.
A.

PRELIMINARY ISSUES

Questions Going Beyond International Humanitarian Law

Many objections against autonomous weapons are situated outside IHL.
Some are moral. To me, it seems obvious that robots can neither “behave”
“morally” nor “immorally.”24 While I would never claim that robots can be

21. DOD Directive 3000.09, supra note 8, ¶ 4(a)(1)(b).
22. Alan Backstrom & Ian Henderson, New Capabilities in Warfare: an Overview of Contemporary Technological Developments and the Associated Legal and Engineering Issues in Article 36
Weapons Reviews, 94 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 483, 493–94 (2012).
23. See INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE
ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW (2009), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/publication
/p0990.htm, reprinted in 90 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 991 (2008)
[hereinafter INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE].
24. Noel E. Sharkey, The Evitability of Autonomous Robot Warfare, 94 INTERNATIONAL
REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 787, 793 (2012).
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more humane than humans,25 I am convinced that only human beings can
be inhuman. Moral judgments are reserved for the human beings creating,
directing and using weapons.
1. May Only a Human Being Decide to Kill Another Human Being?
Many find the very idea that a robot may kill a human being to be horrible.
One philosopher even claims there is an implicit requirement in IHL for a
human decision to kill a person.26 Others wonder whether it is “inherently
wrong to let autonomous machines decide who and when to kill.” 27 However, if this were true, all mines would be prohibited, as well as all weapons
such as missiles that can be directed at a military objective and combatants,
but which do not allow the operator to know who exactly will be killed.
Moreover, today computers already open the bomb bays of bomber aircraft or decide which targets to engage in the case of the Aegis naval defense system when used in the automatic mode.28 If the moral requirement
of human involvement simply means that a human being must decide what
categories of people can be targeted, autonomous weapons, as I understand
them, comply because they are programmed by human beings. Sometimes
this requirement of human involvement is justified by referring to the requirement under Article I of the Hague Regulations29 that a combatant
must be commanded by a person.30 I am, however, not aware of anyone
suggesting that robots would instruct and supervise humans.
In addition, to be lawful31 autonomous weapons must still be subject to
general instructions given to them by humans. The weapon system would
simply apply those instructions autonomously to a given situation.
Beyond that, is it not as horrible to imagine one human being deliberately killing another in the absence of an immediate threat from the latter
as it is to imagine a machine doing the same? But this horror is war where
killing in the absence of a threat is lawful.
25. Id. at 793. Here I agree with Sharkey.
26. Asaro, supra note 5, at 696–703.
27. Heyns, supra note 3, ¶ 92.
28. SINGER, supra note 4, at 124.
29. Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to
Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18,
1907, 36 Stat. 2227.
30. Heyns, supra note 3, ¶ 89.
31. See infra Part IV.B.4 for the caveat that weapons that could autonomously choose
to “go rogue” would be inherently unlawful.
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It would be a misconception of existing IHL to claim that the decision
to kill someone in an armed conflict must be taken after a value judgment
(which a machine is obviously unable to make and must be made by a human being) is made about that person. Whether a person may be targeted
in an armed conflict is dependent on their status (combatant/civilian)
and/or the objective impression resulting from their conduct (direct participation in hostilities) and not whether that person is innocent or guilty of a
crime. What counts, for example, is, not whether a person wants to surrender, but whether he or she indicates their willingness to surrender and the
attacker becomes aware of this indication.
2. Do They Make it Easier to Go to War?
Some fear that autonomous weapon systems make it easier for a country to
go to war and to use force beyond its borders because it no longer risks the
lives of its own soldiers, but only those of civilians on the opposing side.32
This risk is partly mitigated by the fact that it is highly improbable that one
side would fight a war only with robots.33 Additionally, conflict has moved
beyond fighting between the knights or samurai of the Middle Ages; today
many weapons and delivery system technologies permit cross-border attacks. This risk must be countered by ius ad bellum and disarmament.
Importantly, the very decision to engage in an armed conflict must be
reserved for humans.34 It is true that the motivation for a State to comply
with ius ad bellum could be lowered if it could expect that only combatants
and civilians suffering incidental effects of the enemy will be affected.
However, nothing in the law would hinder the opposing side from attacking the human beings—combatants and civilians—who deploy the robots.
Rules of IHL have long been criticized for attempting to “humanize”
war, making it more conceivable and more acceptable. War must be horrible—and horrible for both sides—to deter States and human beings from
resort to it. If this line of argument worked in reality, war would have disappeared; unfortunately it has not. Beyond that, it may well be that the
possibility of secrecy in the use of autonomous weapons and the resulting
difficulties of attribution make the implementation of State responsibility
and of international criminal responsibility for an act of aggression more
32. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 5, at 4, 39; Heyns, supra note 3, ¶ 58; Alston,
supra note 11, ¶ 44; Asaro, supra note 5, at 692.
33. Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 15, at 241.
34. Asaro, supra note 5, at 692.
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difficult. On the other hand, the fact that computer systems register everything—or could be programmed to do so—would make an inquiry leading
to accountability easier.35
3. Unfairness?
A related concern is that the use of autonomous weapons against an enemy
not possessing them itself would be unfair, inter alia, because it would not
involve any risk for the personnel of the attacker, while the defender would
have to fight with actual human beings who would be killed. This would
include not only combatants, but also civilians as incidental victims of a
lawful attack even if IHL is respected. This is, however, a misconception of
existing IHL. For a long time war has not been fair in this sense.36 The idea
that two knights fight against each other and all civilians stand by wondering who will win belongs to the past. No one suggests that a party may not
use its air force or navy if the enemy has no air force or navy, or has no
weapons to combat aircraft. As for the unfairness, contemporary reality
shows that the technologically weaker side may prevail over the stronger
belligerent and impose its political will over the latter. Some claim that the
weaker side tries to compensate for its technological deficit by neglecting
some of the rules according to which it should fight.37 It is difficult, however, to argue that under IHL this risk prevents a party from using technology not available to the enemy.
4. The Risk of Proliferation
As with all weapons, there is obviously a risk of proliferation, and those
developing autonomous weapons are well advised to take that into account.
This risk has an aspect specific to autonomous weapons; a risk which is the
downside to one of their main advantages. I mentioned above that autonomous weapon systems will not violate IHL if they were programmed to
35. Heyns, supra note 3, ¶ 52.
36. Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 15, at 232.
37. Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, Asymmetric Warfare, ¶ 3, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2012),
http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690e1809?rskey=phOWN9&result=1&prd=OPIL; Michael N. Schmitt, War, Technology and
International Humanitarian Law 33, 46–47, HPCR OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES (Summer
2005), http://www.hpcrresearch.org/publications/occasional-paper-series (then OPS
Issue 4 PDF hyperlink).
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respect it. They could even be programmed to refuse orders that violate the
law. The downside of this absolute “discipline” is that if autonomous
weapons fall into the hands of a ruthless leader able to program them, they
will never abandon his or her cause as soldiers might because the programmed robots will be unable to come to the conclusion that it is unjust,
even when there are repeated and widespread violations of IHL.38 This may
indicate that a legal framework on the production, stockpiling and transfer
of autonomous weapons may be necessary. It may be possible to make sure
that they are automatically deactivated if they fall into the wrong hands or
receive instructions contrary to IHL.
5. The Risk of a “Gameboy Mentality” of the Producer?
Some argue that those who build an autonomous weapon and program it
(imagine, for example, a programmer in New Jersey who is the last human
being in the loop able to make targeting-relevant decisions, but who has no
knowledge of where and in what circumstances the weapon is to be used)
are psychologically less committed, feel a greater distance from and less
responsibility for use of the weapon system, and will therefore more easily
adopt a “computer game mentality” than a soldier who is actually on the
battlefield among the human beings he or she will kill.39 As far as I know,
there is no scientific evidence to support this (or the opposing) opinion. In
my experience during the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, I met people
who killed other people face-to-face, and who displayed no more inhibition
than my son would in a computer game. I am not so sure that the producers and programmers in New Jersey would see the world simply as a computer game if they were adequately trained, supervised and subject to appropriate accountability systems. In a peacetime activity in which human
life is at stake, an increasing number of processes are automated and no
one claims that those who devise such processes comport themselves as
though they were playing a computer game. No one requires that those
who produce medical robots work in a hospital and surgery room environment. Similarly, those who produce aircraft parts know that people’s
lives are at risk if they make mistakes, even if they see neither the passengers nor the aircraft.

38. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 5, at 4, 38.
39. Heyns, supra note 3, ¶ 57; Alston, supra note 11, ¶ 44.
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6. Lack of Emotions
A related objection is that robots lack “human emotions and the capacity
for compassion.”40 This is true. In response, however, the human beings
programming the robots hopefully have compassion and there is no reason
why they should have less of it than a soldier in midst of the battle. Second,
I have noticed among those who actually fight armed conflicts at least as
many negative emotions as the positive emotions this argument envisages.41
Third, IHL does not seek to promote “love,” “mercy”42 or “human empathy”43 (a robot is indeed unable to have such feelings), but respect based
upon objective criteria. A soldier may not kill a civilian even if there are
good reasons to hate him or her, while he or she may kill a combatant even
if that combatant is very nice. If “human empathy” was decisive in war,
few combatants would be killed, war would finally disappear and only cases
of peacetime self-defense and defense of others would persist.
B.

International Humanitarian Law Issues which are not Specific to Autonomous
Weapons

When robots are used certain fundamental questions of IHL may become
even more important than would be the case if other means of warfare
were employed. However, the answer to those questions remains controversial. The first question is always what is an armed conflict? We know
that there is no unique definition. The questions are rather: what is an international armed conflict and what is a non-international armed conflict?
What is the threshold of violence necessary to make violence between a
State and a non-State actor (or between non-State actors) an armed conflict?
Those questions are not specific to robots and even when autonomous
weapons are used, the answers must be given—and will perforce be given—by human beings. The answers simply become even more important
when autonomous weapons are used. Indeed, outside an armed conflict,
lethal robots could only be used if they were able to arrest a person, which
is, as opposed to the use of lethal force, always the solution preferred by
human rights law. The deployment of autonomous weapons produced for
40. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 5, at 4, 38.
41. See also Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 15, at 249.
42. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 5, at 34.
43. Id. at 37.
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armed conflicts will be unlawful outside armed conflicts. Soldiers, on the
other hand, can be more easily sent, for example, to ensure security at a
football match. One might obviously imagine programming an autonomous weapon equally capable of distinguishing between hostilities and law
enforcement operations and applying human rights law to the latter. However, this will be an extremely difficult task. Under human rights law, for
example, alternatives to the use of lethal force must be evaluated and the
risk the target presents to human life must be assessed.
Many other questions must find an answer before an autonomous
weapon can be programmed. What is the relationship between international human rights law and IHL? What is the geographical scope of application of IHL, that is, the scope of the battlefield? Autonomous weapons
raise this latter question more acutely, but, legally, the answer must be the
same as for an aerial bombardment. May a belligerent attack a target which
would be a legitimate target under IHL at a location far distant from the
actual fighting, restrained only by the rules of IHL? In such circumstances,
does IHL apply at all, but, if so, does international human rights law prevail
as the lex specialis? Whether drones, missiles or autonomous weapons are
used, the answer must be the same, and however intelligent an autonomous
weapon may be, I cannot imagine that it can provide the answer itself. The
geographical scope of the field of operation of an autonomous weapon and
the circumstances under which it may use force according to its IHL program must be defined by human beings.
IV.

SPECIFIC IHL ISSUES

A. How to Compare the Performance of Robots with that of Human Beings?
1. For a Given Attack
There is widespread agreement that the ability to use autonomous weapons
in compliance with IHL should not be evaluated against a hypothetical ideal, but instead the comparison should be to human beings.44 This is particularly true for the question of whether a precautionary measure is feasible, as
only feasible precautions must be taken under IHL.45 What counts, at a
44. Heyns, supra note 3, ¶ 63; Backstrom & Henderson, supra note 22, at 492; Schmitt
& Thurnher, supra note 15, at 247.
45. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 57, June 8, 1977,
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minimum, is obviously not whether the precaution is feasible for the robot,
but whether it would be feasible for a State employing human soldiers, i.e.,
whether it would be feasible for a person. If it is technically not feasible to
respect certain requirements of IHL with autonomous weapons, this is not
a sufficient reason for abandoning those requirements. The use of an autonomous weapon in such cases is simply unlawful. Human Rights Watch
is correct in warning that once autonomous weapons are developed their
mere availability and military capabilities should never be considered to
mean that there is a “military necessity” to use them, even if they are not as
able as a human being to comply with IHL in a given attack.46 This is simply not the meaning of the principle of military necessity as a prohibitive rule
in IHL.47 Conversely, if autonomous systems are better than human beings,
such as in taking precautions, and a State and a commander have them in
their arsenal and don’t need to reserve their use for other militarily more
important tasks or tasks involving higher risks for civilians, they must use
them.
The bold statement that autonomous weapons may only be used if and
where they are as good as human beings in complying with IHL is, however, subject to two nuances. First, artillery and missiles are not—in the same
manner as a sniper—able to cancel or suspend an attack at the last moment
based on changing circumstances.48 Nevertheless, no one claims that such
weapons are inherently unlawful. What counts is that either the system itself through technical means, or the human beings using it, are able to acquire information indicating that the attack must be interrupted and either
the machine or its human operators are able to react to such information.
1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I]. For its customary character in both international
and non-international armed conflicts, see 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW r. 15–21 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005).
46. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 5, at 35.
47. GABRIELLA VENTURINI, NECESSITÀ E PROPORZIONALITÀ NELL’ USO DELLA
FORZA MILITARE IN DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 127 (1988); William V. O’Brien, The
Meaning of Military Necessity in International Law, in 1 WORLD POLITY: A YEARBOOK OF
STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION 109, 138–63 (1957); 2 GEORG
SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS
AND TRIBUNALS 135 (1968); Robin Geiss, Military Necessity: A Fundamental “Principle” Fallen
into Oblivion, in 2 SELECT PROCEEDINGS OF THE EUROPEAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 554 (Hélène Ruiz Fabri, Rüdiger Wolfrum & Jana Gogolin eds., 2008); Robert Kolb,
La Nécessité Militaire dans le Droit des Conflits Armés—Essai de Clarification Conceptuelle, in SOCIÉTÉ FRANÇAISE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, LA NÉCESSITÉ EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL:
COLLOQUE DE GRENOBLE 151(2007).
48. BOOTHBY, supra note 18, at 285.
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Second, it may well be that the average soldier is better able to respect
certain aspects of IHL than an autonomous weapon, while such a weapon
is better in other respects. The question then arises whether a consolidated
assessment of advantages and disadvantages is admissible or whether an
autonomous weapon must be as good as an average soldier with respect to
every rule of IHL. In my view, the choice of means is always based upon a
consolidated assessment, but such assessment must be made for every attack. It is not sufficient that when compared with alternatives in most,
normal or ideal circumstances a weapon minimizes incidental civilian losses. An autonomous weapon would have to make such a determination in
relation to the specific circumstances of each attack, and indicate, if necessary, that it cannot execute that attack, but that the attack must, if it is to be
carried out, be executed by a human being.
2. When the Autonomous Weapon is Reviewed
In addition, an in abstracto assessment of all possible uses is equally necessary to determine whether the autonomous weapon concerned may be
produced in the first place. Article 36 of Protocol Additional I prescribes:
In the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new weapon,
means or method of warfare, a High Contracting Party is under an obligation to determine whether its employment would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited by this Protocol or by any other rule of international law applicable to the High Contracting Party.

Several States, including the United States which is not a party to Protocol
I, have implemented this requirement through specific procedures.49 Because it is implicit in its substantive obligations—“[t]he faithful and responsible application [of which] would require a State to ensure that the
new weapons, means and methods of warfare it develops or acquires will
not violate these obligations,”50—the ICRC considers that this obligation
binds all States. The establishment of an international body monitoring

49. For commentaries, see INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, A
GUIDE TO THE LEGAL REVIEW OF NEW WEAPONS, MEANS AND METHODS OF WARFARE: MEASURES TO IMPLEMENT ARTICLE 36 OF ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I OF 1977
(2006) [hereafter ICRC GUIDE]; BOOTHBY, supra note 18, at 340–52.
50. ICRC GUIDE, supra note 49, at 4.
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weapons development would obviously be highly desirable,51 but secrecy
concerns are a barrier.52
It is obvious that before autonomous weapons may be deployed, such
an assessment must be made.53 It may be that “reviews should take place at
the stage of the conception/design of the weapon, and thereafter at the
stages of its technological development (development of prototypes and
testing), and in any case before entering into the production contract.”54
However, an evaluation is only possible once the technical capabilities of a
weapon are known, which is not the case at present.55 Admittedly, there is a
risk that once the technology has been developed at great expense vested
interests will make it nearly impossible politically to conclude that the result
is unlawful. The solution may be to accompany the development process
with constant reviews. In addition, one has to make sure that as much effort is invested in developing the weapon’s capacity to respect IHL as in its
lethal capacity, including the development of safeguards against technical
and communication errors.56 Fortunately, to be accurate and to sense and
process as much information as possible is both a military and a humanitarian imperative. As for the actual testing, it is obviously only useful if it can
be excluded that autonomous weapons will act unpredictably in unforeseen
circumstances,57 but here again my technical assumption is that machines
act according to algorithms and, therefore, according to a plan established
by humans, even if that plan instructs them to adapt in a certain way to certain circumstances.

51. YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE
NATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 88 (2d ed., 2010).
52. BOOTHBY, supra note 18, at 343.

LAW OF INTER-

53. See Isabelle Daoust, Robin Coupland & Rikke Ishoey, New Wars, New Weapons?
The Obligation of States to Assess the Legality of Means and Methods of Warfare, 84 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 345 (2002); Justin McClelland, The Review of Weapons
in Accordance with Article 36 of Additional Protocol I, 85 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE
RED CROSS 397 (2003). Specifically for autonomous weapons, see Backstrom & Henderson, supra note 22, 483–514; Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 15, at 271–76.
54. ICRC GUIDE, supra note 49, at 23.
55. As submitted by HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 5, at 22.
56. Alston, supra note 11, ¶ 40.
57. Asaro, supra note 5, at 692–93.
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B.
Machines are not Bound by International Humanitarian Law: Problems of
Attribution and of Accountability
1. Only Humans are Responsible
Only human beings are subject to legal rules. In the case of autonomous
weapons, IHL is addressed to those human beings who devise, produce
and program them, as well as those who decide upon their use.58 I reject
the idea that IHL is inadequate to regulate autonomous weapons because
they would be situated somewhere between weapon systems and combatants, and further reject the suggestion that a new category with new rules
should be created to regulate them.59 The difference between a weapon system and a human being is not quantitative but qualitative; the two are not
situated on a sliding scale, but on different levels—subjects and objects. A
combatant is a human being, only he or she is an addressee of legal obligations. However far we go into the future and no matter how artificial intelligence will work, there will always be a human being at the starting point. 60
In my understanding, an autonomous weapon system will always operate
within the limits of its software; software designed by humans.61 It is the
human being who will decide whether a machine will be created and who
will create it. Even if one day robots construct other robots, there will still
be the need for a human being to develop the first robot and instruct it as
to how to construct new robots. This human being is bound by the law;
the machine is not bound by the law.
Human Rights Watch writes that it would be unclear who would be
held accountable for unlawful actions a robot commits: “Options include
the military commander that deployed it, the programmer, the manufacturer, and the robot itself, but all are unsatisfactory. It would be difficult and
arguably unfair to hold the first three actors liable and the actor that actually committed the crime—the robot—would not be punishable.”62 I agree
with the last part of this statement and I find some suggestions that robots

58. BOOTHBY, supra note 18, at 283.
59. Liu, supra note 1, at 629.
60. Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 15, at 235, 277.
61. DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE ROLE OF AUTONOMY IN DOD SYSTEMS 1, 21 (July 2012).
62. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 5, at 4. See also id. at 40; Asaro, supra note 5, at
693; Sharkey, supra note 24, at 790–91; Liu, supra note 1, at 632.
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could be scrapped or disabled as a kind of punishment absurd.63 As for the
first options, it is as fair to hold a commander of a robot accountable as it
would be to hold accountable a commander who instructs a pilot to bomb
a target he describes as a military headquarters, but which turns out to be a
kindergarten. It is obvious that a commander deploying autonomous
weapons must understand how they function, just as for any other means
and method of warfare. In my view, the responsibility of such a commander is not a case of—nor is it analogous to—command responsibility,64 but a
case of direct responsibility, just as that of a soldier firing a mortar believing that it can land only on the targeted tank, but which will kill civilians he
knows are following the tank. This is a question of the mens rea, intent and
recklessness with which criminal lawyers are familiar, just as it is for a surgeon using a medical robot or, for that matter, prescribing a medicine.
Based on their Protocol I, Article 36 assessment, States deploying robots
must give military commanders and operators clear instructions as to when
and under what circumstances the robots may be actually be used. The operator need not understand the complex programming of the robot,65 but
must understand the result, that is, what the robot is able and unable to
do.66 As for the manufacturer and the programmer, domestic criminal laws
often hold criminally responsible those who deliberately, recklessly or negligently construct defective buildings or machines that lead to the loss of
human life.67 I do not think that the possession of autonomous decisionmaking capacity breaks the causal chain allowing attribution and responsibility,68 because I assume that it is always humans who define how this au63. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 5, at 45 (referring to some who seriously
suggest this).
64. As argued by HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, id. at 42–43; Heyns, supra note 3, ¶ 78.
65. As claimed by Heyns, supra note 3, ¶ 78.
66. DoD Directive 3000.09, supra note 8, ¶ 4(a)(3)(a); Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note
15, at 267.
67. See, e.g., Article 229 of the Swiss Criminal Code criminalizing conduct, either deliberate or negligent, by “[a]ny person engaged in the management or execution of construction or demolition work who wilfully disregards the accepted rules of construction.”
SCHWEIZERISCHES STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [Criminal Code] Dec. 21, 1937, SR 757
(1938) (Switz.), available at http://www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-compilation/1937
0083/index.html. Schmitt and Thurnher consider the suggestion that the producer could
be criminally responsible “spurious.” They do not explain who would be criminally responsible if the commander and operator trust that the system was correctly programmed,
when, in fact, it had not been so programmed. Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 15, at 278–
79.
68. Liu, supra note 1, at 650.
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tonomy will function. This implies the need for drafting specific standards
of due diligence for both manufacturers and commanders.
The further question of whether a robot could distinguish lawful from
unlawful orders69 is equivalent to that of whether they are able to apply
rules to a complex situation without human intervention. If they cannot,
they may not be used. If they can, it will be easy to program them not to
follow unlawful orders.70 None of the reasons for which soldiers often
obey unlawful orders apply to them.
2. The Problem of the Temporal Field of Application
The discussion above may raise problems concerning the temporal field of
application of IHL, as many of those last human interventions—including
development of an IHL compliant program instructing the autonomous
weapon when to use lethal force—may occur before an armed conflict exists. In terms of criminal accountability, war crimes can only be committed
in armed conflicts, thus raising the question of whether pre-conflict conduct is governed by IHL. I would suggest that IHL applies to all conduct
of a State aimed at having effects during an armed conflict. But, in any
event, a State using a weapon which was programmed in peacetime not to
comply with IHL has not taken all feasible precautionary measures in wartime to avoid incidental civilian losses.
For criminal responsibility, the issue is trickier. It might be possible to
treat the person who intentionally programs a system, which is used in
good faith by an operator during an armed conflict, not to comply with
IHL to be the indirect perpetrator of the war crime committed during the
conflict. Another option would be to consider the programmer as a guarantor who is obliged to intervene in wartime to avoid the commission of violations of IHL, thus committing a war crime by omission if he or she does
not intervene. Obviously, if the operator is conscious of the defect of the
weapon, the programmer would be an accessory to the war crime.71

69. Heyns, supra note 3, ¶ 55.
70. Alston, supra note 11, ¶ 34.
71. I am grateful to my colleague, Ursula Cassani, Professor of Criminal Law at the
University of Geneva, for these suggested solutions.
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3. Technology Increases Transparency
On the other hand, technology possessed by autonomous weapons enables
more precise reconstructions of events for criminal inquiries, although under IHL, in contrast to human rights law, there is no “mandatory ex-post
facto review of all footage in cases of lethal use, regardless of the status of
the individual killed.”72 If an inquiry is necessary under the obligation to
search for persons alleged to have committed war crimes,73 an electronic
record will facilitate accountability.74 This presupposes that producers must
program robots to record such information.
4. May Robots “Go Rogue”?
A further technical question arising in this context is whether there is a risk
of an autonomous weapons “going rogue.” Might a weapon one day have
the technical ability, either of its own “will” or as a result of system imperfections, to override its programs and instructions and start “deciding” in a
truly autonomous manner to violate IHL? A philosopher quoted by Human Rights Watch writes, “[T]the possibility that an autonomous system
will make choices other than those predicted and encouraged by its programmers is inherent in the claim that it is autonomous.”75 I understand
“autonomy,” however, as including equally autonomous decisions within a
framework the robot is unable to override. If my understanding is correct,
it would not be unfair to hold the developer of the weapon responsible for
such a design flaw. The risk that the robot “goes rogue” must be avoided
in the way the robot is devised. If this is not possible, such weapons must
be outlawed. The entire implementation and accountability system of international law—as with all law—is exclusively addressed to humans. Ac72. Heyns, supra note 3, ¶ 81.
73. See Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick
in Armed Forces in the Field art. 49, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 50, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85;
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 129, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons
in Time of War art.146, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
74. Alston, supra note 11, ¶ 30 (while in paragraph 36 he writes mysteriously that unmanned systems do not archive information).
75. Robert Sparrow, Killer Robots, 24 JOURNAL OF APPLIED PHILOSOPHY 62, 70
(2007), quoted in HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 5, at 43. Contra Schmitt & Thurnher,
supra note 15, at 242.
326

Autonomous Weapons and IHL: Advantages, Questions and Issues

Vol. 90

countability mechanisms and sanctions directly addressed to machines are
absurd, because machines are not capable of moral choice.
C.
Are Distinction and Proportionality Evaluations Based upon Rational Decisions or Subjective Judgments?
1. Difficulties in Discrimination and Distinction
Concerning discrimination and distinction, advanced technology still remains to be developed before a robot can distinguish as well as a human
being between legitimate and unlawful targets. The problem is not only the
technological inadequacy of sensors, but also of translating IHL into a
computer language.76 Human beings may make a lot of mistakes; even
more mistakes than a machine would have technical failures. Nevertheless,
there are many elements that make a human being understand what is/is
not a legitimate target, and those factors must be reproduced in a computer
program. A robot must be able to sense all the necessary information in
order to distinguish between targets in the same manner as a person. A “civilian with a large piece of metal in his hands” must obviously be distinguished from “a combatant with a rifle in plain clothes.”77 It may be particularly difficult to automate the indicators that convince a human being a
certain person belongs to a category (combatants; possibly members of an
organized armed group who assume a continuous combat function) or is
engaged in conduct (direct participation in hostilities) which makes them a
legitimate target.78 Pending revolutionary technological innovations, this
problem may be solved by allowing a weapon system to target autonomously only those categories of objects that are, without question, targetable.79 It is suggested, therefore, that autonomous weapon systems incapable
of distinguishing meaningfully may be used in an environment where no
civilians could be endangered.80 However, this solution does not fully work
when persons are targets, as anyone may surrender making it unlawful (and
militarily unnecessary) to target them.

76. Heyns, supra note 3, ¶ 67.
77. Id., ¶ 74.
78. Sharkey, supra note 24, at 788–89, and Liu, supra note 1, at 641, argue that this is
impossible.
79. Backstrom & Henderson, supra note 22, at 492.
80. Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 15, at 246.
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As for objects, the definition of a military objective depends on its “effective contribution to military action” and the “definite military advantage” the attack offers “in the circumstances ruling at the time.”81 These
requirements imply a need to be aware of plans and the overall development of a military operation. An autonomous weapon system could therefore not be allowed to remain fully autonomous over time without receiving a constant update on those elements, which determine whether an object may be targeted.
It will be equally difficult to formalize factors which convince a human
being that he or she must cancel or suspend an attack because the target is
not lawful. For a machine to autonomously make such decisions may be
even more difficult because the enemy could feign those indicators which
cause the robot determine that it is confronted with a legitimate target. As
for the reverse situation, that is, the enemy artificially fulfills the indicators
which make a robot calculate that it may not attack under IHL, the fascinating question arises as to whether a machine can be “led to believe”
something, or whether it is possible to “invite the confidence” of a machinetwo elements of the prohibited act of perfidy.82
Another issue of distinction is that an autonomous weapon must be
able to recognize when a legitimate human target surrenders or is wounded
and abstaining from any act of hostility.83 Beyond that, distinction has, in
any case, become a very difficult task in counterinsurgency warfare for
both machines and human beings. I simply do not see any reason of principle why a machine could never become better at fulfilling this task than a
human being. Admittedly, however, as long as the necessary technology
does not exist, human beings must be involved in the process.84
2. Difficulties in Determining who Directly Participates in Hostilities
It is unfortunately still controversial as to exactly what constitutes direct
participation in hostilities. The ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance has suggested an
understanding which, as mentioned previously, will be difficult to translate
into instructions for a machine. The rule suggested by some critics of the
Interpretive Guidance, that is, to make any member of an armed group tar81. See Protocol I, supra note 45, art. 52(2).
82. Id., art. 37; 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 45,
at 223.
83. Heyns, supra note 3, ¶ 67; BOOTHBY, supra note 18, at 286.
84. BOOTHBY, supra note 18, at 233.
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getable,85 will be equally difficult to translate because neither a machine nor
a human being can determine whether an unknown person is a member of
an organization. It is, however, certainly not necessary “to interpret intentions and emotions” in making that determination,86 which would be an
unrealistic criterion for both robots and soldiers when confronted with an
enemy who is not in their control. In any case, if a robot has to be programmed, it cannot be instructed that “it all depends” or to “use reasonable judgment,” or, in other words, to be programmed that the appropriate
action depends on the given situation without clarifying what action should
be undertaken in which situation. In writing a computer program on the
factors on which the targeting decision depends and how those factors can
be determined, clarity will be required.
The definition of direct participation in hostilities raises another problem in connection with autonomous weapons. According to the Interpretive
Guidance, the direct causation of harm, which is one of the requirements for
an act to constitute direct participation in hostilities, “should be understood
as meaning that the harm in question must be brought about in one causal
step.”87 Obviously only human steps can count (because the concept of
direct participation defines who and not what may be targeted). Therefore,
if autonomous weapons are used, the last causal human step leading to the
harm caused may be geographically and temporally removed from the effect. The human being performing this step must be considered as directly
participating in hostilities. In addition, the Interpretive Guidance correctly recalls:
The required standard of direct causation of harm must take into account
the collective nature and complexity of contemporary military operations.
For example, attacks carried out by unmanned aerial vehicles may simultaneously involve a number of persons . . . . While all of these persons are
integral to that operation and directly participate in hostilities, only a few
of them carry out activities that, in isolation, could be said to directly
cause the required threshold of harm. The standard of direct causation
must therefore be interpreted to include conduct that causes harm only in
conjunction with other acts. More precisely, where a specific act does not
85. Michael N. Schmitt, The Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in
Hostilities: A Critical Analysis, 1 HARVARD NATIONAL SECURITY JOURNAL 5, 24 (2010). For
a discussion of the criticism of the Interpretive Guidance in this particular regard, see id. at
14–24.
86. As Heyns, supra note 3, ¶ 68, suggests.
87. INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 23, at 54.
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on its own directly cause the required threshold of harm, the requirement
of direct causation would still be fulfilled where the act constitutes an integral part of a concrete and coordinated tactical operation that directly
causes such harm.88

This interpretation must probably be even wider in cases involving the
use of autonomous weapons than in cases, such as the one provided by the
ICRC in this example, where human-controlled unmanned aerial vehicles
are used.89 In addition, while direct participation in hostilities does not, in
my view, constitute a violation of IHL, IHL inherently requires that States
only use combatants to directly participate in hostilities.90 This implies that
States must entrust to members of their armed forces the last human intervention in the determination of respect or non-respect for the principles of
distinction, proportionality and precaution. By requiring this determination
to be made by soldiers, it should facilitate training, supervision and accountability.
3. Difficulties in Applying the Principle of Military Necessity
As for the evaluation of military necessity, both soldiers and those who
program autonomous weapons have to deal with the controversial issue of
whether or not this principle involves an obligation to capture—rather than
kill—legitimate targets.91 For the same reasons discussed below with regard
to the proportionality evaluation, I am not convinced that a human being is
always better at making this decision, and that a robot is inherently incapable of “determin[ing] whether an intruder it shot once was merely knocked
to the ground by the blast, faking an injury, slightly wounded but able to be
detained with quick action, or wounded seriously enough to no longer pose
a threat.”92
88. Id. at 55.
89. See also BOOTHBY, supra note 18, at 287–88.
90. For a detailed discussion, see LINDSEY CAMERON & VINCENT CHETAIL, PRIVATIZING WAR, PRIVATE MILITARY AND SECURITY COMPANIES UNDER PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 92–107 (2013)
91. On this controversy, see Ryan Goodman, The Power to Kill or Capture Enemy Combatants, 24 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 819 (2013); Michael N.
Schmitt, Wound, Capture, or Kill: A Reply to Ryan Goodman’s ‘The Power to Kill or Capture Enemy
Combatants,’ 24 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 855; Ryan Goodman, The
Power to Kill or Capture Enemy Combatants: A Rejoinder to Michael N. Schmitt, 24 EUROPEAN
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 863.
92. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 5, at 35.
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4. Difficulties in Translating the Proportionality Principle into a
Computer Program
The need to translate the proportionality principle into a computer program for autonomous weapons may present an opportunity to improve
objectivity. This principle, which is codified in Article 51(5)(b) of Protocol
I, prohibits attacks, even if directed at a military objective, if they “may be
expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage
to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.” Despite
the qualities the rule ascribes to military advantage, it is very difficult to
conceptualize. Comparing military advantage anticipated against expected
civilian losses is a process riddled with inevitably subjective value judgments, especially if there is not an absolute certainty that the advantage
gained outweighs the effects on the civilian population, but, instead, the
judgment is less certain. It might, however, be possible to identify, with the
help of both military and humanitarian experts, indicators and criteria to
evaluate proportionality, and to make the implied judgment slightly more
objective. So far, such suggestions have been rejected by military lawyers
who insisted that evaluations on the matter are dependent on the circumstances of particular situations and the good faith of military commanders.93 A machine, however, needs clear criteria and a formula to calculate
proportionality. The need to program autonomous weapons to respect
proportionality (assuming in the first place that they are technically capable
of acquiring, through sensors, the information necessary to apply the principle) may have the advantage of obliging States to agree on how exactly
proportionality must be calculated and also on which parameters influence
this calculation.
In my view, the greatest difficulty an autonomous weapon system will
have in applying the proportionality principle is not linked to the evaluation
of the risks for civilians and civilian objects, but to the evaluation of the
military advantage anticipated.94 I could imagine a robot gathering the necessary information to evaluate risks to civilians and even to proceed to the
necessary evaluation if objective formulas are adopted. However, the “con93. Schmitt and Thurnher so state, although they then somewhat mysteriously claim
that autonomous systems are not in principle unable to make such an evaluation. Schmitt
& Thurnher, supra note 15, at 256, 257.
94. See id. at 255–57.
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crete and direct military advantage anticipated”95 from an attack on a legitimate target constantly changes according to the plans of the commander
and the development of military operations on both sides. Except where
no, or clearly negligible, effects upon civilians can be anticipated, a machine, even if perfectly programmed, could, therefore, not be left to apply
the proportionality principle unless constantly updated about military operations and plans. This is in my view the most serious IHL argument against
the even theoretical possibility of deploying weapons that remain fully autonomous over considerable periods of time.
5. Must Targeting Decisions be Subjective?
Everything discussed thus far implies that there are considerable challenges
for developers of autonomous weapons, and I am not sure they will be ever able to overcome them. Critics object for reasons of principle, however,
that should those challenges be overcome, autonomous weapons would
still violate IHL because “[e]ven if the development of fully autonomous
weapons with humanlike cognition became feasible, they would lack certain
human qualities, such as emotion, compassion, and the ability to understand humans.”96 Their main objection to the theoretical possibility that a
robot could distinguish between targets and make proportionality evaluations in a more objective and reliable way than a human being is that those
rules involve subjective judgments,97 which can indeed only be made by
human beings. I would agree that a machine could never evaluate whether
a witness in a trial is reliable. The question is simply whether targeting decisions are subjective. Many individuals in the military apparently agree that
such decisions are subjective when they reject—the discussion on autonomous weapons aside—very detailed rules on proportionality, precautions
and what constitutes direct participation in hostilities. I agree that “justice
cannot be autonomous.”98 To target a person is, however, definitely not to
render justice or more precisely, it is not a determination that the person
deserves the death penalty, but involves exclusively a categorization of the
95. Protocol I, supra note 45, art. 51(5)(b).
96. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 5, at 29; Heyns, supra note 3, ¶ 55.
97. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 5, at 4; Asaro, supra note 5, at 696–700;
Sharkey, supra note 24, at 789–90; Heyns, supra note 3, ¶¶ 70–74 (more nuanced). Astonishingly, even Schmitt and Thurnher, who fail to explain how a machine could make subjective judgments, merely argue that the subjective decision remains that of the human
being involved. Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 15, at 256, 265–68.
98. Asaro, supra note 5, at 700.
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person (as a combatant) or their conduct (direct participation in hostilities)
without any determination of fault or culpability.
Human Rights Watch gives the following example: “Distinguishing between a fearful civilian and a threatening enemy combatant requires a soldier to understand the intentions behind a human’s actions, something a
robot could not do.”99 I agree only with the last part of the sentence, while
the remainder misconstrues IHL.100 Even a human being engaged in hostilities will never know, and is not required to inquire into, the intent of another human being, but instead will be receptive only to objective indications of the danger a person represents.101 In the example, no one would
criticize a soldier who fired upon a civilian who points, out of fear, a weapon at him or her.
A second example given by Human Rights Watch raises more serious
questions. “[A] frightened mother may run after her two children and yell
at them to stop playing with toy guns near a soldier.” Human Rights Watch
is certain that “[a] human soldier could identify with the mother’s fear and
the children’s game and thus recognize their intentions.”102 First, I am not
so sure that in some of today’s fighting environments, where there are child
soldiers, fanaticized mothers, and differences in language and culture between soldiers and local populations, a human soldier would always be able
to easily identify what was happening in such a situation. Second, what the
soldier must determine is not the intent of the children (becoming a kind
of child psychologist), but the objective risk of harm to him, his comrades
and his mission, based upon objective indicators. Even if the mother was
inciting the children to hate and the children were crying out in hate and
subjectively willing to kill the soldier, the latter could not fire if it was apparent that the pistols were toy guns. Conversely, if the children simply
wanted to play, but fired live ammunition as part of their game, the soldier
could use force. Third, the example nevertheless shows how difficult devising an autonomous weapon capable of replacing a soldier in all circumstances will be.
99. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 5, at 4; Heyns, supra note 3, ¶ 55.
100. It is not surprising that Human Rights Watch references writings by a philosopher and a computer scientist, not those of a lawyer, to support this proposition. HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 5, at 31.
101. International Committee of the Red Cross, Fifth Expert Meeting on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities: Summary Report 37, 42, Geneva, Switz., Feb. 5–6, 2008 (May 9,
2008), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/2008-05-report-dph-2008icrc.pdf.
102. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 5, at 31.
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It is true that “common sense,” meaning the ability to make a sound
practical evaluation of social situations, is based upon human experience. It
would be particularly difficult to create a machine to reproduce this,103 but
herein could lay an opportunity to create “objective common sense” based,
not upon the life history of one individual, but of several persons—ideally
of mankind. I do not consider that autonomous weapons would only be
lawful if they could demonstrate omniscience, but only if they can, on average, do a better job than an average soldier.
As for the proportionality rule, several authors and military manuals indicate that its application involves a subjective determination.104 The question is, however, whether this is simply a description of the unfortunate
reality, while recognizing that the determination should ideally be as objective as possible, or whether this is a normative proposition that the determination should be subjective. I admit that States have not yet been able to
quantify how the risk of losing one civilian life compares with the potential
of gaining a certain military advantage, nor what relation between the risk
and the advantage would be excessive. I think, however, that both for human operators and for autonomous weapons it would be desirable if a
formula for such a calculation, together with indicators of the elements that
should/should not be taken into account, could be agreed upon.
Obviously, the determination must be made on a case-by-case basis
(and modeling and determining indicators for the infinite variety of possible situations will be a perhaps insurmountable difficulty for producers of
genuinely autonomous weapons105), but I do not see why it should be “subjective.”106 According to one definition, subjective means
relating to the way a person experiences things in his or her own mind;
based on feelings or opinions rather than facts; . . . a characteristic of or
belonging to reality as perceived rather than as independent of mind; relating to or being experience or knowledge as conditioned by personal
mental characteristics or states; peculiar to a particular individual; modified or affected by personal views, experience or background . . .; arising
from conditions within the brain or sense organs and not directly caused
by external stimuli . . . .107
103. SINGER, supra note 4, at 131; Sharkey, supra note 24, at 789.
104. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 5, at 32; Heyns, supra note 3, ¶ 70.
105. Alston, supra note 11, ¶ 39; Sharkey, supra note 24, at 789–90.
106. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 5, at 32; Asaro, supra note 5, at 701.
107. Subjective, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com
/dictionary/subjective (last visited Apr. 16, 2014).
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But why should a certain civilian be better protected under the law from
incidental effects arising from an attack by one soldier than by another soldier? Why should the soldier’s youth, education, values, religion or ethics
matter at all? Should not the only consideration be the military advantage
to be gained and the incidental effect upon civilians?
When the ICRC Commentary states that a commander must use “common sense and good faith,”108 this does not, in my view, mean that the decision must be subjective. Taking the wide latitude of possible common
sense evaluations into account, I would clearly prefer more precise criteria
upon which to base decisions. I would not exclude robots from making
such evaluations simply because they would do so in a necessarily objective
way. Similarly, in my view, the International Criminal Court for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) did not require that the determination of proportionality be subjective when it held: “In determining whether an attack was proportionate it is necessary to examine whether a reasonably well-informed
person in the circumstances of the actual perpetrator, making reasonable
use of the information available to him or her, could have expected excessive civilian casualties to result from the attack.”109 This is due to the fact
that it tries individual human beings and not, as Human Rights Watch argues, because a proportionality evaluation requires “psychological processes in human judgment.”110 To the contrary, the ICTY formula attempts to
liberate the evaluation from the purely subjective judgment of the attacker
(which must nevertheless be taken into account when assessing his or her
mens rea).
D.

Autonomous Weapons make Additional Precautions Possible

Precautions in attack, in particular those listed in Article 57 of Protocol I,
must be taken only if they are feasible. Obviously, whether a certain precautionary measure is feasible has to be measured against the alternatives
available to those who plan and decide upon an attack or who execute it,
108. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GECONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 182 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski &
Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1987). See also Heyns, supra note 3, ¶ 72 (who uses the same
terms).
109. Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment, ¶ 58 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003).
110. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 5, at 33.
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and not against the possibility for a machine to take a certain measure.
Conversely, however, an autonomous weapon could be a means to render
certain precautions, which would not be available to a soldier, feasible.111
Because the human life of the pilot or weapons operator is not at risk, using autonomous weapons may result in the ability to take additional precautions. “Robots can thus act ‘conservatively’ and ‘can shoot second.’ Moreover, powerful sensors and processing powers . . . can potentially lift the
fog of war for human soldiers . . . thus save lives.”112 Obviously, this advantage is reduced if the enemy is prepared to defend against robot attacks.
Those who produce robots will then program them to shoot first to avoid
being destroyed by anti-robot weapons. We are then back to the classical
situation in warfare.
Intelligent weapons have an additional advantage. The feasibility of
precautions evolves through experience. When precautions taken in the
past proved unsuccessful, that may imply the need to learn lessons (and
belligerents have, in my view, an obligation to foresee pertinent procedures) to avoid such incidents in the future. If artificial intelligence can be
created, it is essential to make sure that weapons with such intelligence can
be recalled and reprogrammed, and that human beings monitor the development of that intelligence in order to quickly take advantage of lessons
learned.
A legal issue arising is that important precautions, such as the obligations to verify the nature of the target and the lawfulness of the attack, to
choose means and methods avoiding or minimizing incidental effects on
civilians and to respect the proportionality principle, are addressed by Article 57(2)(a) of Protocol I only to “those who plan or decide upon an attack.” Some wonder whether this means that a human being must plan and
decide to conduct the attack.113 As discussed above, in my view, all rules of
IHL are addressed only to human beings. This does not, however, preclude
human planners and decision makers from being temporally and geographically removed from the attack, as long as they define the parameters according to which the robot attacks, make sure that it complies with them
and has the necessary information to apply such parameters.
A major problem in terms of precautions is the obligation to cancel or
suspend an attack
111. Kellenberger, supra note 16, at 813.
112. Heyns, supra note 3, ¶ 69. See also Alston, supra note 11, ¶ 30.
113. BOOTHBY, supra note 18, at 233.
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if it becomes apparent that the objective is not a military one or is subject
to special protection or that the attack may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or
a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.114

Does this mean because an autonomous weapon is used and no human
perceives the change in circumstances that the rule cannot, therefore, be
violated?115 In my view, the State’s obligation to ensure that commanders
do everything feasible to verify the lawfulness of targets implies that weapon systems must be designed to allow such verification—either through the
system itself or by a human. Even those who favor lethal autonomous
weapons do not seem confident that such weapons could be intelligent
enough for it to become apparent to them that an attack is unlawful. They
therefore suggest that there should be “some version of a human override.”116 This may, however, raise the problem that machines process information so quickly based upon such a vast store of information that a
human will be unable to really comprehend, evaluate and, if necessary, interrupt the machine’s operation.117 In addition, humans will have a tendency to trust the computer and hesitate to override it, as the example of USS
Vincennes shooting down Iran Air Flight 655 demonstrated. Finally, communications between the human who is supposed to conduct the override
and the machine may be disrupted or manipulated by the enemy.118 It is my
understanding, logically, if autonomous weapons are able to distinguish in
the first place, they should be equally able to sense changes in their situational context and to cancel an attack if the given information indicates it is
unlawful. If they are not able to distinguish in the first place, it would be
inconsistent with IHL to deploy them autonomously.
For attacks involving autonomous weapons, as for any other attack,
greater transparency about the precautionary measures taken and those dis-

114. Protocol I, supra note 45, Art. 57(2)(b).
115. As rhetorically asked by BOOTHBY, supra note 18, at 285.
116. Jeffrey S. Thurnher, No One at the Controls: Legal Implications of Fully Autonomous
Targeting, 67 JOINT FORCES QUARTERLY, 4th Qtr. 2012, at 83.
117. Heyns, supra note 3, ¶ 41; Alston, supra note 11, ¶ 41; BOOTHBY, supra note 18, at
286; DEVELOPMENT, CONCEPTS AND DOCTRINE CENTRE, MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, JDN
2/11, THE UK APPROACH TO UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS 5–10 (2011).
118. Singer, supra note 4, at 125, 127.
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carded as not feasible, would be highly desirable.119 In accordance with international human rights law, States could also initiate inquiries, the outcomes of which would be made public. Planning and decision making are
by definition secret, and it is often impossible to determine what the commander knew and what alternatives, if any, were available at the time of the
attack. However, a higher degree of transparency after the fact would be
useful for both the defendant and the prosecutor before an international or
domestic court if criminal charges were brought. It would help prove the
unlawfulness of certain behavior or, conversely, prove that IHL was respected. Greater transparency would be particularly useful in setting forth
the facts for events that unnecessarily make the headlines or are used for
propaganda purposes. The credibility of IHL would in turn be reinforced.
Hence, it is regrettable that States and military lawyers often refuse to even
start discussing such proposals, perhaps in fear of potential criticism and
criminal prosecution.120 The fact that operations by autonomous weapons
always leave an electronic trail would facilitate such transparency and inquiries.
V.

CONCLUSION

I assume even autonomous weapon systems with artificial intelligence,
though capable of learning, cannot do what the human beings who created
them do not want them to do—or that it is at least possible to limit their
autonomy in this regard. Such must be the case because they are not addressees of the law. If this is true, I cannot exclude that it may one day be
possible to construct autonomous weapon systems which are capable of
perceiving the information necessary to comply with IHL (this appears to
me as the main challenge moving forward) and then to apply IHL to that
information. For the time being, and pending evidence of revolutionary
technical developments, it may be wise to limit the use of autonomous
weapons to situations in which no proportionality assessment is needed
and where the enemy consists of forces declared hostile in high-intensity
119. Marco Sassòli & Lindsey Cameron, The Protection of Civilians Objects—Current Status
of the Law and Issues de lege ferenda, in THE LAW OF AIR WARFARE: CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 35, 71 (Natalino Ronzitti & Gabriella Venturini eds., 2006).
120. See Marco Sassòli & Julia Grignon, Les Limites du Droit International Pénal et de la
Justice Pénale Internationale dans la mise en Ouvre du Droit International Humanitaire, in LE DROIT
e
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITAIRE FACE AUX DÉFIS DU XXI SIÈCLE 133, 142 (Abdelwahab
Biad & Paul Tavernier eds., 2012).
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conflicts. I believe it will still take time before they can be used in counterinsurgency operations. However, the IHL on targeting does not require
subjective value judgments that machines are unable to make, but depends
on an objective assessment of facts.
If my two technical assumptions and my understanding of IHL are correct, an attack executed by autonomous weapons would have many advantages in terms of distinction, proportionality and precautions over an
attack directly executed by human beings. The development of autonomous weapons may even lead, because of programming needs, to a clarification of many rules that have so far remained vague and whose protective
utility currently depends upon subjective value judgments. Most arguments
of principle against autonomous weapons either do not withstand comparison with other means and methods of warfare—although the risk of proliferation has to be taken very seriously in this case—or they are based upon an erroneous understanding of IHL.
There are, nevertheless, challenges when applying existing IHL to autonomous weapons which necessitate agreement on the proper interpretation of IHL by every State using them and between States. As with all
weapons, users must be appropriately trained and subject to accountability
mechanisms, which requires that autonomous weapon systems keep records. Accountability must, however, equally apply to the producers. Such a
requirement of accountability implies the need for agreed professional
standards, but also that lawyers agree on the temporal field of application
of IHL and the application of international criminal law to conduct occurring in peacetime which produces results during armed conflict.
In addition, in an environment in which the proportionality principle
must be applied—and theoretically even to determine what is a military
objective—autonomous weapon systems must be constantly updated on
the plans and progress of operations to enable them to evaluate whether a
definite military advantage can be anticipated to result from the attack and
whether the risks for the civilian population are excessive compared with
the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.
Finally, parameters must be established for comparing the performance
of autonomous weapon systems with that of human beings in carrying out
attacks. The feasibility of precautions must be understood to refer to what
would be feasible for human beings employing the machine, not to the
possibilities available to the machine. A particularly tricky issue is to determine, in case autonomous weapons are used, the meaning of the obligation
to cancel an attack when it becomes apparent that the attack is unlawful.
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This implies that autonomous weapons possess sensing capability and ability to change behavior.
It is to be hoped that these issues will be discussed in the forthcoming
experts’ and States’ meetings addressing the possible need for new rules on
autonomous weapons.
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